Yes Think is about international as well as independence issues
Main issue today: understanding unionists
The first three essays on Yes Think, this being the third, refer to matters in the context of the campaign for independence. Achieving that objective is obviously the priority, but thinking of the Scotland that would emerge from independence is of equal importance, because that Scotland is the one that will figure in the minds of unionists when they evaluate the next serious appeal we make for them to join us.
Before this essay goes further into understanding unionists voters, which is its primary purpose, I should explain that Yes Think will go far beyond the boundaries of Scotland and the UK on issues. This is a personal opinion: in my view devolution has not widened the interests of Scotland’s political class but narrowed it, making us more parochial in the devolution setting than when we were in the sole league of the UK.
That view may be contradicted by the fact that events in Gaza are right at the forefront of our politics today. But even the most narrow of minds could not avoid Gaza. Outside of Gaza, defence, foreign affairs, the structures of the rules based international order, the global south’s response to it, and the longer term consequences of the re-balancing of the world economy, get little attention. “Defence” in Scotland is about the Trident base and NATO, but actually very little is said about how NATO’s political and military structures work, and where its weaknesses as well as claimed strengths are. As for the wider area of foreign affairs, one of the most notable features of the last two SNP annual conferences was the lack of resolutions on the subject. Yes, Nicola Sturgeon did shout loudly about being with Ukraine. She repeated the shout, but there was no policy paper, or reasoned discussion on how the crisis arose, and how it might be resolved given Ukraine’s strategic weakness of being wholly reliant on external powers for its weapons. China-Taiwan looms large upon the world’s agenda, and raises the most intricate international legal questions to be resolved, not to mention the economic implications, and the potential power struggle for control of the Pacific. It does not seem to figure in the SNP mind.
Again, however, there could be argued against me that the SNP does have, and articulates its interest in foreign affairs as proved by its continued denunciations of Brexit and promotion of re-joining the European Union. But that position is shallow. There is no analysis of the power structure of the EU, its system of voting at Council of Minister level, the trade-off between sovereignty and perceived benefits, the timescale of entry, the price that might be asked for entry, nor a look at an alternative with EFTA.
There have been, to their credit, two exceptions within the movement’s main party the SNP. The former foreign affairs spokesperson Stephen Gethins, now a Professor at St. Andrews University, and Stewart McDonald the present MP, now on the backbenches, who writes a weekly column for The Scotsman.
Understanding the Unionists
I was a unionist, and perhaps seeing my journey to independence will help understand the unionists. Mine was a slow burn from that position to, first, devolution and then to accepting that independence is essential if the people of Scotland are to live in a society that can deliver the employment security and high wages, needed to end poverty. I am not a natural nationalist. I was a proud Scot, but also saw myself as British. In my journey towards independence I did not define myself in relation to England, as I think a number of independence supporters do. That underlying grievance about 1707, evident today with the constant references to breaches of the Treaty of Unionthe 1689 Claim of Right, and the consistent complaints in and out of Holyrood about “Westminster” doing us down emphasise the English dimension in Scottish political life. Don’t believe me? Listen to the words of our adopted national anthem Flower of Scotland.
In nationalist circles 1707 is seen as the betrayal. Bought and sold for English gold. Bribery took place: a standard practice in those days. But that Scotland was sold for those bags of gold was not how I as a unionist saw it, or see it today. Scotland’s loss of sovereignty was an act of High Politics, where our national interest and that of England, for different reasons, came together.
If England was to be secure, it had to eliminate the border threat that gave France potential leverage through the use of Scotland as a proxy. That was the English objective, and its Aliens Act was a measure designed to advance it. Scotland, severely weakened by the collapse of the Darien scheme, found its national interest could no longer be sustained by its independence, but could be met by a new engagement with England as that nation expanded its reach into the world, and its resources.
Geography, spheres of influence and national interests are the factors that govern relations between states. They were decisive in 1707, which was a triumph for English foreign policy, with the Scots exacting a price that ensured the continuation of key national institutions, and gaining what they failed with Darien, entry to the new game of empire.
That it was, and remains, a lopsided union with English national interests always predominant is evident from history. Given the relative size (and wealth) of the parties, and the realpolitik of England’s offer of union, it could not be otherwise. It was never a slip of the tongue that from its creation the new union was known as England, not only abroad but within this island. In cabinet minutes, House of Commons debates, memoirs, newspaper articles, the UK was described as England.
What was it that Leo Amery shouted out in the House of Commons on 2nd September 1939 as Arthur Henderson (labour) rose to confront Chamberlain – “Speak for England Arthur.” In his memoir of WWII, published in 1948, Winston Churchill notes that, in the moment of high crisis, Neville Chamberlain addressed “the English nation.”
It is by seeing 1707 in its true light, a matter dictated by national interests, that we can best talk to unionists about why we should end our engagement with England. Put bluntly, realpolitik today means that what was once in Scotland’s national interest to be in a union with England is no longer valid as a policy.
National interest, as I have found in addressing meetings is not a concept immediately grasped by Scottish people. We have not had to think in those terms for more than 317 years. National interest is not an interest loaded with sentimentality. It is about what is best for the nation exercising it in its relations with others. Given the evident decay and decline of the union we entered in 1707, it is not in Scotland’s national interests to continue with that contract.
Our fellow citizens
It will be difficult for our unionist fellow citizens to see Scots having national interests, and if put the way I have done they will try to escape its relevance by describing it as selfish. But unless we can get the people, including unionists, to see it as central to our condition as a nation, I am doubtful if we shall get to the level of support where we set the agenda. Our national interest exists; it is best served by independence; and we should state that bluntly on every occasion there is debate.
But confronting unionists with national interest alone will not get them to listen to us. It might, as I say, put them off a bit. If we are to win people over, we have to understand and respect them. Not one of the virtues of independent activists now or in recent times.
We can start our discussion with unionists by acknowledging that while we don’t agree with their belief that the union is worth preserving, we accept it as genuine on their part; when they declare themselves to be both Scots and British, that is a legitimate position; and that not for a moment do we doubt that they have as much concern for Scotland as we do.
We should acknowledge that there is an inescapable British influence on many Scottish people, of which they are right to be proud. It could not be otherwise after 317 years of being together. The joint experiences of the industrial revolution, the birth and growth of the trade unions, the rise of science, gaining the franchise, extending it to women, all-union political parties, social progress, the development of state institutions, the creation of the welfare state, inter-marriage – all, and more, have contributed to building the social union in which, while the nations are different, has created powerful similarities in outlook and values. As Margo MacDonald pointed out in the mid-1970s much of that social union will endure after independence.
It isn’t a matter of telling our fellow citizens that they are misguided. That would be an insult. Or, as some are doing at present, arguing that Scotland is a colony being pillaged by a rapacious external power, and that while supporting the union they are complicit in the rape of our natural resources. They will never believe it.
We have to patiently ask, and sometimes challenge, them to look at the reality of the UK’s key component England, whose condition of decline is being laid bare week after week. We have to explain that we understand an attachment to a union which in the past was a powerful one, but explain that past and does not serve well the present. Along with state interests there is another powerful interest at play: self interest. We must point to what is becoming clear: that as part of the UK individual families face irreversible decline in living standards, and that it is not in any Scots’ interest to accept that fate.
There is good reason for making the effort with unionists
Winning independence is step one. How we make an independent Scotland a success is what matters in the long run. In that context today’s unionists are as important as we are. For Scotland to be a success the whole nation will need to be united and committed to that aim. That will not be achieved through winning a narrow majority, leaving a substantial minority as losers. Whether they be losers or sore losers is what will be crucial.
Whether they are losers who accept the result or are sore losers depends mainly on how the independence side conducts itself towards them. That is a message that has to be understood and acted upon.