Ukraine and Russia, what is to be done?
Ukraine and Russia, what is to be done?
War creates its own dynamic: As the difference between this year and last shows
This time last year, as Ukraine’s military planned its offensive, British newspapers were full of articles about the breakthrough that would take back the Donbas territories held by Russia. Experts on television, with maps, showed where the main thrusts would come. There was speculation that Putin was ill, and there were assertions in some media outlets that the morale of Russian soldiers was so bad after watching the Wagner fools get slaughtered, that they might run away in the face of the coming Ukrainian push for victory. Repeated statements from the US highest command, the Presidency, and European leaders, were unambiguous: Ukraine would get all it needed to succeed.
A few voices begged to differ. One retired general who wished to remain anonymous pointed out that Western leaders were expecting the Ukrainian forces to do what no NATO army would contemplate: breaking through exceptionally well-prepared in-depth defences without adequate firepower and without air superiority. Russia had spent the winter constructing three lines of defence – barbed wire, a massive minefield and lines of trenches made of concrete; and an army led by generals who had learned from earlier mistakes. It was impossible for Ukraine to breakthrough.
And so here we are today. No talk of breakthrough, but of defending against a Russian offensive; and President Zelensky begging for the armaments and air power without which it will be difficult to hold off the Russians, who are now backed by a war economy which is producing tanks, bombs, shells, aircraft and drawing from a big pool of manpower. Ukraine is rationing its shells, firing one to Russia’s ten. There are still statements of support from Western leaders, but the flow of cash and armaments are nowhere near to what is needed. Ukraine’s strategic weakness, an almost total reliance on external suppliers of cash and weapons, is laid bare for the Kremlin to see: Ukraine’s fate is entangled in the political machinations of the US Congress. Victor Orban of Hungary put it frankly and brutally when in Washington DC earlier this month: “it is obvious that Ukraine cannot stand on its own feet.”
There are four major problems faced by President Zelensky.
First, manpower allied to recruitment for the army. With the heavy battering civilian infrastructure and businesses are taking from Russia’s unrelenting bombardments, he needs people to keep the economy going. That is one reason conscription to the armed forces excludes men under the age of 25. But if you exclude too many of the young, then you have to take in the 45s and 50s, who are not the best material for war fighting, where energy and stamina are at a premium. Despite the country being at risk, conscription is not popular. A Bill that would lower the age of conscription from 27 to 25 is stalled in the Ukraine parliament., When the commanding general asked for 500,000 more recruits, it was not politically possible to meet his demand, so he was pushed out.
Second, Ukraine must create defences along a very long line. If these are to be as in-depth and secure as the ones built by Russia, then resources in material and manpower are required. Cash is needed to buy the materials, and if the army is expanded to do the construction, then there are fewer hands to re-build and repair the domestic economy.
Third, we come back to firepower. According to Ukraine internal reports, leaked to US newspapers (for onward transmission to the US Congress), Russian forces are enjoying a 5-1 advantage in supplies. In the air Russia’s air superiority is undiminished because Ukraine lacks adequate antiaircraft missiles, which can only come from the West, principally the United States.
Fourth, Ukraine is broke. It cannot sustain its war effort and pay for essential services from its taxable base. It needs loads of cash from its Western backers, outside of its needs for actual armaments.
Although heavily reliant on external support, Ukraine and its people have been far from passive. They have deployed what they have, and have shown remarkable innovation in the area of drone warfare. But there is no way they can escape their strategic weakness. Their fate, their definition of victory, or compromise, lies as much with others as it does with them.
A Unique War in many ways
The West
Let us take first the role of its Western backers, and contrast Ukraine today with Britain in 1940. Britain too was broke, but even although the USA was not at war with Germany Roosevelt invented lend-lease, a programme that gave Churchill’s government everything it needed in armaments and food in a continuous flow without immediate payment. That was to come long after the war ended. No Western lend-lease has been crafted for Ukraine. Donations come from individual countries, and the EU as a whole. There is no certainty. There is no guarantee that aid will not diminish or cease.
From the start, Western rhetoric pointed to unity of purpose in standing by Ukraine, but there was muddle born of ambiguity. What did the West want to happen? Did it want Ukraine to do as Zelensky stated, win back every inch including Crimea? I can find no definitive statement from a Western leader backing that position. Some leaders gave the impression of being more concerned with what Russia might do if on the brink of being driven from the Donbas, never mind Crimea.
As for that “whatever it takes” commitment remember Germany’s “we will send tanks if you, the USA, send yours first.” Air superiority? Sorry can’t do. F-16s? What if one falls into Russian hands and they get to know it inside out? Finally, a yes, but still not delivered.
It is of coursed a fact that Ukraine has received massive budget and military aid from western states, and would not be still standing without it. But there has been no lend-lease type of assistance where it has received what it needed when it was needed. Perhaps that is because there is no unified clear Western war aim for Ukraine to accomplish.
Russia’s free hand: With Ukraine on a Western leash
The Ukraine-Russia war is a unique one. I cannot find in history any other war where the rules allow one side to bomb, blitz, destroy the homes, hospitals, schools, energy and other civil infrastructure at will, while the recipient is forbidden to retaliate in like fashion. That rule is laid on Ukraine by its Western suppliers, which has it on a leash, because they are afraid that Russia might, just might, resort to using its nuclear weapons if Ukraine did to Moscow and St. Petersburg what Russia continues to do to Kiev and other Ukrainian cities.
Ukraine has sent drones into Russia proper, damaging some flats, and, on a more important scale, attacking oil refineries, and sinking ships of the Russian Black Sea fleet. But these are minor in comparison with what Russia has and is doing. There are reports in the United States newspapers that the White House is a bit concerned about attacks on the oil refineries, as this can have an effect on world oil prices, that might end up with higher prices in the gas tanks of America’s millions of cars and trucks, this being an election year. No, I didn’t make that up.
But on a more serious matter, not enough attention has been paid to the wider world implication of Western fear of Russia going nuclear. Those countries which have nuclear weapons will have taken note of why Ukraine is in this strategically weak position: it dismantled its nuclear arsenal when leaving the Soviet Union for security guarantees that have proved not worth the paper written on. Read on.
Unique Security: guaranteed by four permanent members of the UN Security Council
When the Soviet Union collapsed Ukraine had a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons, and could have become a major power much more potent than France and the UK. The control system, with codes, was in Russia, but it was technically possible for Ukraine to gain full operational control. Belarus and Kazakhstan also had nuclear sites, but nowhere near to that of Ukraine. Neither had any intention of retaining them. Ukraine did not automatically follow, but had a debate which concluded that it should become non-nuclear provided it received security guarantees from the USA, Russia and UK with whom it was negotiating.
Non-nuclear status was finalised in the Budapest Memorandums (one for each state) co- signed on 5th. December 1994 by USA, Russia and the UK (three nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council), who gave the following security commitments to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan:
Respect their independence and sovereignty in the existing borders.
Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the three former Soviet signatory states, and undertook that none of their weapons would ever be used against them except in self-defence or in accordance with the charter of the UN.
Refrain from exercising economic coercion on them.
Seek to give immediate action and provide assistance if any of the three former Soviet states should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
Not to use nuclear weapons against them unless they were attacking the USA, Russia and UK in an alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
Enter consultations with all concerned if questions arose regarding these commitments.
In response to the Memorandum, China congratulated Ukraine and, unilaterally, gave it guarantees of security if threatened by another nuclear power. It cemented this position with the 2013 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Ukraine and China. The communique stated: “China pledges unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Ukraine, and under the conditions of Ukraine suffering an invasion using nuclear weapons or suffering the threat of such kind of invasion, to provide Ukraine with corresponding security guarantees.”
With those two pieces of international law guarantees, unique for having been signed by four out of the five permanent UN Security Council members, Zelensky’s government had grounds for its belief that Russia would not invade, and for not having built a war economy , even after Russia took Crimea.
Ukraine lodged a complaint with the International Court of Justice two days after Russia invaded, and in March 2022 among the Court’s provisional findings it ordered Russia to immediately suspend its military operations. Therein is laid bare the problem with international law: there is often no remedy that can be applied to those who breach it.
Putin’s selective view of state legitimacy
Putin: “Ukraine is an artificial state that was shaped by Stalin’s will.” “Ukraine actually never had stable traditions of statehood.” In short: Ukraine is really Russian territory, and is not a legitimate member of the international community. Experts on Russia have said this is not a lie in the Putin playbook, but something he believes. That might explain his choice of “Special military operation” rather war as his reason for invading.
He is, of course, correct in that Ukraine’s position in the international community was due to a decision by Stalin to insist that as well as the USSR, Ukraine should have a seat in the United Nations from the day of its formation. He is also correct that Ukraine, prior to that, did not feature in the world of recognised independent nations. But neither assertion by Putin renders Ukraine non-legitimate in the post-Soviet world.
Along with Ukraine, Belarus’s position was shaped by Stalin’s will. It too, as Byelorussia, had a seat in the UN right from the start. And what about Kazakhstan? Putin has never suggested that those two are illegitimate states.
It is easy to disparage the Putin view, and lay bare its contradictions, but that frame of mind will be important to understand, and be ready to combat, if the West and Ukraine ever get him to the negotiating table. Before then he should be asked if he only took that view of Ukraine when it turned towards the West, and was no longer solidly pro-Russian.
To borrow phrase from Lenin: What is to be done?
On paper, given that the USA, EU, and NATO states are engaged in active support of Ukraine, it would seem inconceivable that Russia might beat Zelensky’s government into submission. Stewart McDonald MP (SNP) has written that Ukraine can win because its allies “UK, EU and US – outmatch Russia 30 to one and represent a bloc that is diplomatically, militarily and economically superior to their adversary.” All true. Russia’s GDP is no greater than Italy’s. Its GDP per capita is around $15,300, which doesn’t compare to France $40,886 or even Portugal’s $24,515, to take but two European examples. .
But Stewart McDonald’s confidence about a win only holds true if that 30 bloc has the unity of organisation and purpose that draws together its mighty potential strength and projects it in the supply of weapons and cash to Ukraine. That is not the case. Moreover, a number of key suppliers of arms are short of them, and short of the level of production needed to sustain Ukraine now it is, as seems likely, in a war of attrition.
The war of attrition developing on the battlefield is one where Russia attacks and Ukraine defends. While Ukraine struggles for troops on the frontline, Russia, with a population more than three times that of Ukraine, can put 30,000 fresh troops each month into combat, supplied by a war economy and external supply sources from two well stocked states, North Korea and Iran.
A war of attrition suits Russia and creates significant pressures on Ukraine’s Western bloc backers. Does the West have the political stamina to maintain the level of support Ukraine needs to hold off Russia this year and next? If the Western powers don’t want attrition to be the norm, do they have the will to supply Ukraine with the massive firepower allied to air superiority (which means giving hundreds of tanks and aircraft) needed to defeat Russia and take back the Donbas? On that, the jury is still out.