Labour blocks £50 BILLION of new investment into North Sea Oil & Gas industry
In the North Sea, the key problem is not geology but policy resulting in 1,000 jobs/month being lost through mismanagement by Westminster.
Listen to Industry Experts on how Labour is destroying jobs in the North Sea
There is a brilliant broadcast by industry experts on the North Sea Oil & Gas industry here:
I’ve used an AI engine to summarise the top twenty points listed below. However, I strongly encourage you to listen to and share the full podcast. It is also free to hear on Apple Podcasts & Spotify. What’s happening to this vital Scottish industry is a wholly preventable tragedy. One that is largely being ignored by the Scottish political class and a woke mainstream media.
Key Industry Points on Energy Policy
Keep these points in mind when you listen to Labour MPs like Dr. Jeevun Sandher MP waffle on about oil running out in 5 years. This doctor of political economy has as much of a clue about energy policy as he does about fixing your elbow but that doesn’t dissuade him from gaslighting Scots on the North Sea.
UK households and industry face some of the highest electricity prices in the developed world, but gas itself is no longer the main driver as gas prices have fallen sharply from 2022 peaks.
Evidence from suppliers and historic price data suggests that policy costs, subsidies, and system charges linked to renewables are now a major cause of high electricity bills.
From the mid-2000s to 2021, wholesale gas and power prices stayed broadly low and stable while retail electricity bills rose steadily, implying the increase was driven by the energy transition rather than fuel costs.
Wind has received large direct subsidies for decades, and early cost reductions have stalled; capital and operating costs are now rising again due to normal industry drivers (materials, labour, energy).
Renewables’ low energy density and location mean huge extra grid and connection costs (new “wires” and infrastructure in remote areas), which are socialised onto consumer bills rather than paid by project developers.
Because wind and solar are intermittent, gas capacity must be kept on standby and paid via capacity markets, and system balancing costs have risen by billions per year to manage real-time variability.
The gas fleet (especially CCGTs) is being used in a way it wasn’t designed for—rarely and flexibly—which raises maintenance costs and reliability risks, especially as a large portion of the fleet is old and nearing end-of-life.
With nuclear closures coming and ambitions for further electrification, failure to reinvest in gas generation assets risks serious security-of-supply problems and potential blackouts.
In the North Sea, the key problem is not geology but policy: exploration drilling has collapsed (no exploration wells in 2025), a red-flag indicator of future supply decline.
The UK’s Energy Profits Levy (windfall tax) and unstable fiscal regime have driven companies and capital away, in stark contrast to Norway’s high but stable and investment-friendly tax system.
There is still substantial recoverable oil and gas in the UK sector, especially through new technology, infill drilling and tie-backs to existing infrastructure, but this depends on a supportive policy and tax environment.
The industry is already shedding around 1,000 UK jobs per month, supply-chain firms are leaving (e.g. shifting factories abroad), rigs are moving to more attractive regions, and critical pipeline infrastructure is at risk of becoming uneconomic.
If key North Sea infrastructure is shut down, viable reserves may be stranded, triggering a disorderly, sudden decline in production with major consequences for UK energy security and gas availability on cold winter days.
The speakers argue the current problems are “self-inflicted” and could be quickly reversed if the upcoming budget: (a) removes the EPL now, (b) sets a pragmatic long-term licensing regime, (c) accelerates consents for new projects like Rosebank and Jackdaw, and (d) adopts a positive political tone toward the sector.
Industry says it doesn’t need subsidies—just a fair, predictable regime (e.g. reverting to the pre-2022 40% rate plus a properly designed, genuine windfall tax), which could unlock an estimated £50bn of new investment.
Trust in UK fiscal promises is low; merely pledging to end the EPL in 2029 is viewed as insufficient because companies doubt future governments will stick to it, so investment decisions require immediate, credible change.
The discussion stresses that oil and gas underpin modern life far beyond power and heating—fertilisers, food production, hospitals, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, and all modern technology depend heavily on hydrocarbons.
Producing more oil and gas domestically is portrayed as better both economically and environmentally: it supports UK jobs and tax revenues, avoids higher shipping emissions, and leverages the UK’s relatively strict environmental and safety standards.
Norway’s backlash against electricity exports (after interconnectors raised domestic prices and volatility) is cited as an early example of resource nationalism that could threaten UK electricity imports and expose the risks of relying on other countries.
The speakers conclude that the next two weeks (budget and “future of the North Sea” consultation outcome) are a critical inflection point: either the UK pivots pragmatically to support domestic hydrocarbons and secure supply, or it continues on a path toward infrastructure loss, higher reliance on imports, and rising blackout risk.